The main current application ofplacebo is in clinical research. The term placebo effect refers to diverse nonspecific, desired or non-desired effects ofsubstances or procedures and interactions between patient and therapist. Unpredictability of the placebo effect necessitates placebo-controlled designs for most trials. consequences of the administration of placebos became known as "the placebo effect", comprising the total of unexplained consequences of administering placebos as well as active treatments. Due to, amongst other things, the unpredictability of placebo effects in individuals and patient groups, placebos came to play an irreplaceable role as "inactive" controls in randomised clinical trials (RCTs).
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The first rather isolated placebo-controlled clinical trial took place in 1916 and was conducted by Macht who compared the analgesic action of morphine with that of physiological saline.2 It was only in the 1940s and 1950s that the large-scale use of placebos in clinical research emerged, simultaneously with scientific knowledge pertaining to the placebo effect. The unabated need for placebocontrolled clinical trials is illustrated by several anecdotes in the development of presumedly therapeutic procedures. Surgical ligation of the internal mammary artery, once proclaimed to be efficacious for treatment of angina pectoris, might serve as an example. In the 1 950s, considerable relief of symptoms was reported for patients with angina pectoris subjected to bilateral ligation of the internal mammary artery. In the early '50s, Italian clinicians Battezzati and colleagues3 were the first to apply this technique, and the Reader's Digest published an enthusiastic report.4 A year later promising results were also reported by American researchers who based their enthusiasm upon data from non-controlled trials.5-7 It only took two double-blind placebo-controlled studies, involving 35 subjects, to disprove the presumed efficacy of this putative treatment. Fourteen subjects were placebo-treated (sham-operated) and 21 underwent a ligation of the internal mammary arteries under local anaesthesia.89 The placebo procedure consisted of parasternal skin incisions without ligation, while the "active" treatment consisted of parasternal skin incisions followed by ligation of the internal mammary artery. It was demonstrated that internal mammary artery ligation did not increase cardiac muscle perfusion and had no effect on the pathophysiology of coronary artery disease. Although deception was obvious in these two placebo-controlled trials (patients were not informed about the possibility of sham operation), the double-blind evaluation of the procedure's effect in 35 patients prevented wide-spread introduction of this non-efficacious surgical procedure.
Demonstration of safety and effectiveness of a drug is a legal requirement for marketing drugs in many countries. In the USA, evidence submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to meet this requirement has to include results of "adequate and well-controlled investigations" capable of distinguishing "the effect of a drug from other influences, such as spontaneous change in the course of the disease, placebo effect, or biased observation". Deception in the therapeutic use of placebo might be ethically acceptable in few well-defined cases, for example, when the physician is dealing with subjects with a history of substance abuse or when subjects have to be withdrawn from certain addictive agents. Indeed, in these cases, giving placebo without obtaining consent of the patient, will almost invariably contribute to the patient's well-being, and in addition does not imply that one withholds a possibly beneficial medical treatment. Other therapeutic usage of placebo in non-informed patients is regrettable, ethically unacceptable and illustrative of ignorance and prejudice. It needs to be stressed, however, that malingerers or drug addicts are not relieved more efficiently by placebo. Quite on the contrary, most studies suggest that such patients are less likely placebo responders. Also, complaining or "manipulative" patients are no more likely to respond to placebo than patients who are well liked by the hospital staff. '7 In the scientific application of placebo, however, informed consent should be mandatory, implying that thorough information with regard to the rationale, the design, the eventual standard therapeutic procedures for the given disease, the randomisation procedure as well as the chance of being randomised to placebo should be communicated and discussed. Moreover, informed consent procedures require subjects to be informed about all risks and benefits associated with the trial and their right to withdraw at any time. Some authors disagree with this and oppose compulsory informed consent. Brewin'8 argues that "too much information may be as bad as too little". This author also suggests that some investigators, once in possession of written informed consent, might become less concerned than they should about their ethical responsibilities. Still other authors perceive an incompatibility between informed consent and placebo control. Levine'9 warns us about subjects who are thoroughly informed of the expected therapeutic and adverse effects of pharmacologically active agents in placebo-controlled trials. In several clinical trials, subjects unblinded the study by correctly guessing their treatment assignment. Levine'9 proposes a modification in consent procedures that would eliminate or at least reduce this possibility without defeating the ethical purpose of informed consent. Levine suggests adding irrelevant side-effects in the provided information that are of the same order of importance as the actual expected side-effects. This is consistent with the ethical purposes of informed consent in that it entails disclosure of material risks.
Another poignant issue concerns the patient's ability to understand placebo-controlled trials. Do the patients really know what placebo means, do they realise that they have a certain chance of receiving placebo and why they will be on it? Stanley20 reviewed the literature and concluded that irrespective of their condition and whether or not they were psychiatric patients, patients were fairly able to understand the risks and benefits of a proposed treatment and the purpose of a particular treatment or procedure.
Conflict between Hippocratic and scientific obligations
The therapist-researcher is subject to two fundamental ethical obligations, a Hippocratic one and a scientific one. The therapist's Hippocratic obligation obliges him/her to apply all existing knowledge for the best possible treatment of individual patients. On the other hand, in agreement with the researcher's scientific obligations it is unethical to produce unsound scientific data. Thus, it is the duty of the researcher to acquire new knowledge so that future patients might benefit, and to communicate accurately this knowledge to the scientific community in order to contribute to the collective benefit. However, these two obligations may on certain occasions be in contradiction to the execution and design of placebo-controlled RCTs. According to certain people, randomisation by itself means that patients are no longer treated purely for their own good but are used at best for the benefit of future sufferers from their condition, at worst merely to satisfy scientific curiosity, and that they risk being treated inappropriately. It is thought that some kind of sacrifice is being demanded of them and that they should either be given a full explanation or else not randomised.
The primary question is whether it can be ethically justified to deprive a certain percentage of patients in placebo-controlled trials of their "right to receive" treatment of acknowledged efficacy merely in order to verify whether or not other active treatments exist. Withholding treatment of proven efficacy clearly violates the therapist's commitment to individual patient welfare. However, the conflict between therapist and researcher more often is emotionally, rather than scientifically, based. Patients can be allocated to standard therapy control groups, or to placebo groups when no standard therapy exists, without violation of Hippocratic commitment; developing new treatments of an already (partially) treatable disease need not necessarily be dangerous to the subject. Some therapists stress the pragmatic viewpoint of the RCT: only the application of an accepted treatment as control arm can answer the question whether the new treatment improves on a standard method. The use of placebocontrolled RCT designs is the only way to minimise the number of ineffective drugs and therapeutic procedures. The conviction that ignorance may cause patient harm may not only be used as a justification for research but in addition renders research an ethical obligation. The important ethical difficulties associated with the widespread application of a new treatment without a trial, and consequently potentially without specific effects but with varying degrees of side-effects, is far greater than those associated with the trial itself. The optimal and therefore often placebo-controlled and ethically founded RCT meets the duties of benefiting society and increasing knowledge without jeopardising the well-being of the experimental subjects.
There . We argue that placebo application in clinical epilepsy research can be considered ethically acceptable under certain conditions and in the following trial designs: (a) placebo-controlled add-on designs in intractable epilepsy; (b) developmental drug monotherapy versus placebo in pre-surgical video-EEG or videoinvasive neuroelectrophysiological monitoring (in order to be able optimally to observe epileptic seizures in this patient population, the baseline medication is withdrawn in the pre-surgical workup; following this short observation period, the efficacy of the new developmental drug can be compared against that of placebo); (c) active control designs with attenuated form of the active control (in this design, an active control group is used but the administered dosage of the classical antiepileptic agent is too low to be really effective); (d) placebo-controlled design in de novo patients presenting with a first-ever epileptic seizure.
We suggest that monotherapy designs b and c should always be preceded by more 
Conclusion
Since it is inadmissible to perform ill-designed clinical trials and to market compounds or employ treatments without specific effect (efficacy not exceeding that of placebo) and/or with serious sideeffects, properly controlled RCTs form the only scientifically valid tool. Nature of the disease process, duration of the study period, therapeutictoxic ratio of the agent tested, availability and appropriateness of alternative therapy, and many other considerations all play a role in clinical trial design. Even though the placebo-controlled RCT remains the gold standard in therapy development, the need for and acceptability of placebo control has to be evaluated case by case, considering and reconciling both scientific and ethical issues. Often, placebo control might even be considered an ethical obligation but some provisos should be kept in mind: (a) no adequate therapy for the disease should exist and/or the (presumed) active therapy should have serious side-effects; (b) placebo treatment should not last too long; (c) placebo treatment should not inflict unacceptable risks on the patients, and (d) the experimental subject should be adequately informed and informed consent given.
News and notes
First International Conference on DNA Sampling
This first international conference on DNA sampling will be held in Montreal, Quebec, Canada from September 6-8 this year.
The conference will provide a forum for interdisciplinary discussion on: DNA sampling and banking; patenting and commercialisation; legal status of human genetic material and information; models of consent and confidentiality; policy and ethical concerns; and genetic epidemiology and diversity. 
